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Abstract
We study how the investor profile influences the asset allocation recommendations of
professional advisors. We find the investor’s perceived risk attitude influences the mix
of risky assets more, whereas the socioeconomic variables influence the cash percentage
more. The recommendations are consistent with a diversification behavior driven by
actual asset correlations. These findings support the utility of investor advisory that may
help enhance the risk and return trade-off. The main drawback of the recommendations
may consist in the degree of customization that is limited by the small number of investor
characteristics actually influencing the asset allocation.
JEL Classification: G11
I. Introduction
In this article we examine how the investor profile influences the asset allocation recom-
mendations of professional advisors. Our aim is to explain the fundamental features of
asset allocation, such as percentage invested in cash, the portfolio risk and the pursuit of
diversification strategies. We do so by resorting to the investor perceived risk attitude and
socioeconomic variables that in the advisor jargon are called “risk capacity” (Roszkowski,
Davey, and Grable 2005).
We find strong evidence that the risk attitude influences both the percentage
invested in cash and the mix of risky assets, even if its impact is stronger for the lat-
ter. On the contrary, the risk capacity influences more the percentage invested in cash.
The psychometric paradigm, grounded in basic cognitive psychology, provides tech-
niques that, resorting to psychophysical scalingmethods andmultivariate analysis derived
from questionnaires, produce a quantitative representation of risk attitude (Nunnally and
Bernstein 1994; Grable and Lytton 1999). This guarantees the independence of risk atti-
tude and risk capacity. In our framework the investor’s data gathering, where risk attitude
is simply self-assessed by the investor, does not guarantee this condition. Nevertheless,
we find the empirical relation between the two constructs is not sufficiently strong to
make risk attitude a proxy for risk capacity.
The asset allocation can be developed following two alternative approaches: the
static, short- term perspective and the strategic, far-sighted one. Under the static approach
the investors should use cash mainly to risk adjust the portfolio aligning it to their risk
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138 The Journal of Financial Research
attitude. On the other hand, pursuing an effective strategic asset allocation requires a
dynamic and intertemporal perspective where all variables featuring the future develop-
ment of investor consumption and wealth over time may play an important role (Brennan,
Schwartz, and Lagnado 1997). The long-run investors should use cash as a contingency
reserve to meet unexpected consumption needs rather than for the risk adjusting, which
is driven mainly by the risk attitude and the investment horizon (Campbell and Viceira
2001).
Our results are therefore consistent with the strategic approach, when it gives
to the risk attitude a not-prominent role in the cash proportion. However, although we
find few risk capacity variables are significant, strategic asset allocation would state that
several risk capacity dimensions, starting from age and the investment horizon, should
have an important impact on the risky asset mix (see, among others, Campbell and Viceira
2002; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005). We claim that a too pronounced prevalence
of the risk attitude may result in recommendations that are both less customized and less
suited to clients’ needs, causing substantial welfare losses (Campbell and Viceira 1999).
Another important issue in asset allocation is diversification: we demonstrate that
advisors split funds among asset classes by looking at the actual correlations and that they
do so by consistently taking account of the risk attitude. This is a noteworthy result because
both experimental (Kroll and Levy 1992) and empirical (Dorn and Huberman 2007)
evidence demonstrate that investors overlook correlations. We believe that investment
in mutual funds may limit the effectiveness of a naı¨ve strategy that would not be able
to improve noticeably the diversification that funds already guarantee by definition. In
fact, if investors restrict their choice to the instruments proposed by the broker himself
or herself, they are exposed to a supply bias (Benartzi and Thaler 2001), whereas if they
browse in the market it must be considered that the ordinary investors are driven more
by formal features, such as name, than by fundamentals (Cooper, Gulen, and Rau 2005).
Thus, advisors may add value to the investment decisions of their clients by enabling
them to pursue sensible diversification strategies.
We also analyze whether the recommendations are influenced by the characteris-
tics of investors, as well as those of advisors. We control for the advisors’ characteristics,
such as their nationality and the amount of the assets managed by their company. These
characteristics do not explain the unexplained variability of recommendations in the
investor profile.
Our article contributes to the empirical assessment of the value for investors of
what, according to Statman’s classification (1999), can be called “investor advisory.”
Whereas active investment advisors should focus on beating the market, investor ad-
visors should customize the service by furnishing truly tailor-made recommendations.
Mainstream financial theory has for a long time overlooked the role of financial interme-
diaries in household finance (Campbell 2006). Moreover, the most popular point of view
in dealing with this topic has been that of investment management, which is the ability
to beat the market and generate positive alphas. Such studies assess the risk-adjusted
performance of asset allocation recommendations not issued for specific investors (e.g.,
Jaffe and Mahoney 1999; Annaert, De Ceuster, and Van Hyfte 2005).
The importance of investor advisory is grounded on the fact that investors
are often unable to pick the right point along the efficient frontier, therefore suffering
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substantial losses. Because customization is the key feature of investor advisory, studies
matching investor prototypes with asset allocation choices only partially address the most
relevant aspect of investor advisory (Canner, Mankiw, and Weil 1997). Bluethgen et al.
(2008) deal with actual investors, but they only analyze the advisors employed by the
same intermediary and their results must be treated with caution. Therefore, this study
may help fill an important gap in the literature.
II. Data
We use a data set based on the investment recommendations published every Sunday by
Il Sole 24 Ore—the most important Italian financial newspaper—in its column entitled
“The Expert Advises” (in Italian, “L’esperto consiglia”).1 First published on September
27, 1998, the column initially appeared every two weeks; it now appears weekly. Data
were collected up until December 28, 2003 (the four weeks after September 11, 2001
were excluded). We analyze a data set of 420 investment recommendations made by
135 advisors (98 were Italian, 72.60%; 37 were foreign, 27.40%) over more than five
years, coding all the available information manually.
The financial advice column is organized as follows. For each installment, the
newspaper editorial office submits to a portfoliomanager or an executive of an investment
firm (such as banks, mutual fund companies, or other firms active in asset management)
the profiles of two investors who have described their social and economic profiles to the
editorial office.
Because we want to understand the advisors’ behavior, it is not important how
the investors are selected or whether they are representative of the Italian population. It is
sufficient that they cover a wide range of profiles so that we can test the advisors’ choices
under a wide set of alternative circumstances. Moreover, the absence of a clear rule for
the selection of advisors, apart from working for a well-known company, might limit
the descriptive power of our analysis. However, our data set has at least two noteworthy
features: it is composed of 135 advisors, many more than in other studies (see, e.g.,
Siebenmorgen and Weber 2003, where the data set consists of 23 advisors), and it is
not restricted to Italian advisors, even though the recommendations are furnished by an
Italian newspaper.
With respect to the advisors, we know their identity, the investment firm for which
theywork, their nationality, the wealthmanaged by the company, andwhether the advisors
manage their own company’s funds (see Table 1). Thus, in our models we include three
variables capturing the main features of the advisors. Specifically, we include the natural
logarithm of wealth to control for the investment firm’s size and two dummy variables to
capture the advisor’s nationality and the ownership of the recommended funds.
In the column, the advisor suggests a portfolio for each investor. The proposal
often consists of a mix of mutual funds or similar products. The advisor often suggests
1According to the European Journalism Observatory, the newspaper’s total circulation in 2005 was almost
400,000 copies.
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TABLE 1. General Descriptive Statistics.
Advisor
Recommendations Advisor Nationality
Year No. % Foreign (No.) Italian (No.) Foreign (%) Italian (%)
1998 24 5.71% 4 20 0.95% 4.76%
1999 74 17.62% 16 58 3.81% 13.81%
2000 58 13.81% 18 40 4.29% 9.52%
2001 80 19.05% 32 48 7.62% 11.43%
2002 90 21.43% 32 58 7.62% 13.81%
2003 94 22.38% 24 70 5.71% 16.67%
Total 420 100.00% 126 294 30.00% 70.00%
Advisor Ownfund Advisor Size (in Billions Euros)
Year No. % Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
1998 20 4.76% 2.563 1.220 4.390 0.476
1999 57 13.57% 36.094 119.310 680.000 0.071
2000 26 6.19% 65.400 184.636 893.000 0.062
2001 36 8.57% 23.431 48.159 181.000 0.100
2002 42 10.00% 48.467 93.982 400.000 0.030
2003 32 7.62% 26.275 61.540 302.000 0.030
Total 213 50.71% 36.162 101.114 893.000 0.030
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics about some general features of the advice. Specifically, the table
summarizes the advice frequencies by issuing date (Advisor Recommendations), by advisor nationality (Advisor
Nationality), distinguishing between Italian and foreign advisors, by the wealth managed by the company (Advisor
Size), and whether the advisor recommends own funds (Advisor Ownfund).
the funds managed by a specific investment firm, although she or he sometimes indicates
only the class: for instance, a fund specialized in European stocks, in emerging markets
bonds, and so on.
The investor’s portrait is rather composite. It starts with the risk attitude assess-
ment defined by the investor himself or herself using one of these expressions: low,
medium–low, medium, medium–high, or high.
We group the other variables constituting the investor profile into the following
dimensions (see Table 2):
1. Investor features: age, investment horizon;
2. Family composition: defined either by the number of family members (single
vs. couple) or by the number of children still living with the family; and
3. Economic and financial position: annual income, annual saving, financial
wealth,2 home ownership, borrowing (typically in the form of a long-term
mortgage).
Some of the data can be measured straightforward, and others pose difficulties.
The investment horizon is often described using expressions like: short, medium–short,
2These three data are expressed in thousands of euros.
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medium, medium–long, or long. To reduce doubts and the room for different interpreta-
tions, we follow the rule of not classifying data unless they are specified numerically.
With regard to home ownership and borrowing, we know of their existence but
usually not their value or amount. We therefore model them as dummy variables.
III. Hypothesis Development and Research Design
Following the classic portfolio models, we assume that the choice of portfolio depends
on beliefs (the forecasts for returns on different asset classes) and preferences, that is, the
willingness to take risk.
Although we have only some general information about the advisors and no
systematic data about their beliefs, investor preferences are well covered. However,
the structure of the data set, where each advisor makes two recommendations for two
investors,3 enables us to overcome this lack of data and consistently estimate the effect
of investor preferences. The data set is a panel consisting of a sequence of observations,
repeated over time, on a set of statistical units, namely, the different advisors. The main
advantage of this kind of data set over a classical cross-section or time-series data is
that it enable us to study the advisors’ behavior at the single unit level. Heterogeneity
across units is in fact central to such analysis. This heterogeneity, known as the individual
effect, can either be observed, as in the advisor’s nationality, or unobserved, as in the
case of heterogeneity in skills and beliefs. Whereas an ordinary linear model can be used
to model only the observed differences,4 the panel approach enables us to control for
unobserved heterogeneity as well.5
In our analysis we keep the risk attitude separate from the other investor features
in accordance with the psychometric paradigm that treats it as a psychological construct
that should bemeasuredwith psycho-scalingmethods andmultivariate analysis applied to
questionnaires filled in by the subjects. The risk attitude, derived from psychometrically
validated questionnaires, and the economists’ notion of risk aversion, derived from lottery
choice decisions, are strongly inversely related (Faff, Mulino, and Chai 2008).
All the variables concerning the investor’s economic and demographic profile
taken together are what advisor jargon calls “risk capacity” (Roszkowski, Davey, and
Grable 2005). Whereas risk attitude measures how much risk an investor is comfortable
taking, risk capacity defines how much risk an investor can and should take if he or she
wants to fulfill his or her investment aims. The combination of risk attitude and risk
capacity defines the investor’s actual willingness to take risk.
Before applying this conceptual framework we perform a preliminary test. In
our data set, in fact, we cannot take as given the hypothesis that risk attitude and risk
3Some advisors issue more than two sets of advice because they have been involved more than once in the
newspaper column.
4The least squares estimator would be biased and inconsistent because of omitted variables. The model would
consider the 420 items of advice in our data set as if they were issued by just one advisor, ignoring the fact that we
have 135 different advisors, each issuing at least two items of advice.
5We use a fixed effect model because the Haussmann test does not support the consistency of the random
effect estimator.
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capacity are two different constraints that are, at most, weakly related, because the
investor profiling is not consistent with psychometric procedure. The risk attitude level
is given by the investor in person and not in a questionnaire designed to measure the
investor’s psychological attributes. Therefore we test the relations between risk attitude
(RISKATT) and risk capacity (RISKCAP) with the following ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression:
RISKATT j = α RISKCAP j + εj ,
where j represents each investor.
Once we have established that risk attitude is not simply a proxy for risk capacity,
we test how the investor profiles affect the advisors’ recommendations with the following
model:
Yi = (Constant + ui ) + a RISKATTi + β RISKCAPi + εi ,
where ui represents the fixed effect for each advisor i, the risk attitude (RISKATT) is a
scalar assuming values from 1 (low-risk attitude) to 5 (high-risk attitude),6 and the risk
capacity (RISKCAP) is a vector of the following variables:
AGE = investor’s age, measured in number of years;
HORIZON = time horizon, measured in number of years;
D_SING = dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor is a couple, 0 otherwise;
N_CHIL = number of children;
SAV = saving, measured in thousands of euros;
INC = income, measured in thousands of euros;
FIN_W = financial wealth, measured in thousands of euros;
D_BORR = dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor is borrowing money from
a financial institution, 0 otherwise; and
D_HOME = dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor is a homeowner, 0
otherwise.
The dependent variable of the model has different specifications to test different
asset allocation issues. Their definition has to take into consideration that the recommen-
dations in our sample consist of a mix of mutual funds or similar products: sometimes
the advisor suggests the funds managed by a specific investment firm; sometimes he
or she indicates only the class, for instance, a fund specialized in European stocks, in
emerging markets bonds, and so on. We fitted each fund as a set of market benchmarks;
for instance, an investment in a balanced fund specialized in EMU markets was split
according to this rule:
6We also tested nonproportional metrics, either less than proportional (using a logarithmic scale) or more than
proportional (using an exponential scale), but the statistical results were less significant than those from the linear
scale.
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• 50% invested inMSCI EMU index;
• 50% invested in JPM EMU aggregate all maturities, a bond market
benchmark—if the fund was a stock balanced fund, the investment was split
thus:
o 75% invested inMSCI EMU index;
o 25% invested in JPM EMU aggregate all maturities index.
Table 3, Panel B reports the set of market benchmarks used. To minimize the
approximation implied by this approach, we use 66 benchmarks covering a wide range of
possible asset classes among cash, bonds, and stocks. We measure recommendation risk
by calculating for each month an updated variance–covariance matrix of daily returns in
euros for the entire set of benchmarks.Weuse both previous-year and previous-three-years
returns, but in the results we report only regressions based on the previous-three-years
returns because their explanatory power is systematically higher. Table 3, Panel A shows
descriptive statistics on the risks of asset allocation proposals.
We design our analysis of advisor behavior to test whether advisors pursue asset
allocation policies consistent with a static or a dynamic perspective. Whereas the static
perspective postulates that the risk attitude should influence only the proportion invested
in cash, the dynamic perspective postulates that the risk attitude, together with other
variables of the risk capacity, should exert a strong influence also on the composition of
the risky portfolio (Brennan, Schwartz, and Lagnado 1997). We run estimate two models
using two different dependent variables. In the first model, we use the cash ratio (CASH),
which is the percentage invested in cash, here considered to be the risk-free asset, and in
the second model, we use the standard deviation of the risky portfolio (RISKY ), which
excludes cash.
In formal terms:
CASHi = (Constant + ui ) + α RISKATTi + β RISKCAPi + εi ,
RISKYi = (Constant + ui ) + α RISKATTi + β RISKCAPi + εi .
Then, considering cash as a low-risk rather than risk-free asset, we estimate a
third model in which the dependent variable is the overall portfolio risk (PORTRISK)
proxied by the standard deviation of the overall portfolio. We estimate the following
model:
PORTRISKi = (Constant + ui ) + α RISKATTi + β RISKCAPi + εi .
The other issue that we study concerns the advisors’ diversification behavior. We
test the relation between the investor profile and diversification behavior among asset
classes to understandwhether the advisors’ diversification behavior is driven by the actual
correlations.
We calculate two measures of diversification among asset classes and insert
them as dependent variables into our models. The first measure is the Herfindhal index
(HERFINDHAL), which captures diversification behavior without taking the correlations
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TABLE 3. The Standard Deviation of Portfolio Returns (% values).
Panel A. Portfolio Risk Measures
Variables Whole Portfolio (PORTRISK) Risky Portfolio (RISKY )
No. of observations 420 417
Mean 9.22 0.46
Standard deviation 0.19 4.17
Minimum 2.17 2.17
Maximum 0.96 25.43
Panel B. Set of Market Benchmarks
Cash Indexes
JPM Italy Cash 12M
JPM Euro Cash 12M
JPM Euro Cash 3M
Bond Market Indexes
Government and High grade Corporate and High Yield Convertible
JPM Global Broad Index ML Global Large Cap Corporate ML Global 300 Convertible
ML US Tresaury 1 – 10 YRS ML US Corporate Master ML Europe Convertible Bond
JPM Europe Government Bond FTSE Pfandbriefe
ML PAN-Europe Broad ML Global High Yield
JPM EMU Aggregate All Maturities ML European Issuers High Yield
JPM EMU Aggregate 7 – 10Y JPM EMBI Global Composite
ML Italian All Maturities JPM EMBI Global Europe
JPM Global Government Bond
ML UK Gilts All Maturities
ML Japanese All Maturities
Stock Market Indexes
Geographical Market Sectors Styles
MSCI World MSCI World Industrials MSCI World Value
MSCI USA MSCI World Real Estate MSCI World Growth
MSCI Europe U$ MSCI Europe Real Estate MSCI USA Value
MSCI EMU MSCI World Energy MSCI USA Growth
MSCI Pacific ex Japan MSCI World T/CM SVS MSCI Pacific Growth
MSCI Italy MSCI World IT Services MSCI Europe Value
MSCI UK MSCI World Pharmaceutical MSCI Europe Growth
MSCI Germany MSCI World Biotechnology MSCI EMU Value
MSCI France MSCI World Financial MSCI EMU Growth
MSCI Switzerland MSCI World Utilities MSCI Italy Value
MSCI Spain MSCI World Cons Discr MSCI Italy Growth
MSCI Portugal FTSE4Good Global MSCI World Small Caps
MSCI Belgium MSCI USA Small Caps
MSCI Japan MSCI Europe Small Caps
MSCI Australia MSCI Italy Small Caps
MSCI Emerging Markets Europe
MSCI Emerging Markets
Note: All the risk metrics are based on the returns volatility and calculated by a backward approach collecting
daily returns over a three-year period. PORTRISK is the risk of the whole portfolio and is calculated as the annual
standard deviation of a portfolio built on the overall asset classes recommended by the advisor to each investor.
RISKY is the risk of the risky portfolio and is calculated as the standard deviation of a portfolio built just on the
risky asset classes recommended (i.e., excluding cash) by the advisor to each investor.
jfir_1312 jfir2011 1-13-2012 :1183
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
146 The Journal of Financial Research
into account. The index is defined in the following way:
HERFINDHAL =
N∑
i=1
w2i ,
where wi is the percentage invested in the asset class i. The index takes value 1 when
the portfolio is invested only in one asset class, and value 1/N when the funds are split
equally among the suggested asset classes.
The secondmeasure captures the extent to which the imperfect correlation among
asset classes reduces portfolio risk, given the weight structure of the suggested asset
classes. We call this index DIVERBEN and it is defined as:
DIVERBEN = σ
2
p|ρ=1 − σ 2p
σ 2p|ρ=1
=
∑
i = j
∑
j
wiw j (1 − ρi, j )σiσ j
σ 2p|ρ=1
,
where σ 2p is the variance of portfolio returns calculated using actual correlations, and
σ 2p|ρ=1 is the variance of portfolio returns when all correlations are set to 1. In our asset
allocation recommendations, whose asset weights were always positive, the index takes
values close to 0 when the correlations among asset classes are close to 1 and/or when
the asset weights are heavily concentrated.
We hypothesize that the joint interpretation of the relation between each index and
the investor profile sheds light on the drivers of the diversification behavior of advisors.
If we find that the relation with the Herfindhal index is significant, whereas that for the
DIVERBEN is not, we will infer that advisors decide to concentrate (or to diversify) the
asset weights ignoring asset correlations. In this case they would pursue mainly a naı¨ve
diversification strategy. On the contrary, if we find that the relation with the DIVERBEN
is significant whereas that with the Herfindhal index is not, we will conclude that advisors
do not simply split funds among asset classes but consider return correlations.
In more formal terms, we test these models:
HERFINDHALi = (Constant + ui ) + α RISKATTi + β RISKCAPi + εi ,
DIVERBENi = (Constant + ui ) + α RISKATTi + β RISKCAPi + εi ,
where the independent variables are defined previously.
Once we design a research framework to understand how the investors’ features
influence asset allocation, we move to the supply side of the service trying to find out
whether the advisors’ features may play a role in the process. Unfortunately this analysis
is less in-depth and conclusive because the column provides little information about
advisors.
In our previousmodels we specify that the advice depends only on the variables of
risk capacity and risk attitude. Because the regression residuals represent the unexplained
variation after fitting the specified regression, the error terms capture the measurement
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errors and nonmodeled features of the advisors. Therefore, regressing advisor features
on the residuals, we study whether the former could explain what remains unexplained
by the investor profile.
For each of the models tested before we run this OLS regression:
Yi = Constant + α ADVISORi + εi ,
where the dependent variable is the residual series of each model and ADVISOR is a
vector of the following variables:
LNSIZE = the natural logarithm of the assets under management of the firm
the advisor works for;
NATIO = dummy variable equal to 1 if the advisor is Italian, 0 otherwise;
and
OWNFUND = dummy variable equal to 1 if the advisor recommends funds
managed by his or her own company, 0 otherwise.
IV. Findings
The Investor Portrait: The Relation between Risk Attitude and Risk Capacity
The psychometric paradigm states that risk attitude must be measured by creating a score
from a validated questionnaire (Grable and Lytton 1999). This ensures the validity and
reliability of the measure, as it is not simply a proxy for the other features of investors,
what we call “risk capacity.” Nevertheless, an influence of the economic and demographic
variables on risk attitude is well documented: it decreases with age (Hallahan, Faff, and
McKenzie 2004), it increases with wealth and income (Carrol 2001) and education
(Haliassos and Bertaut 1995), and it is lower for females (Barber and Odean 2001). The
relation with marital status is more controversial and the literature has not reached yet a
unique position (see Hallahan, Faff, and McKenzie 2003, 2004).
In our data set, where risk attitude is simply self-assessed, it might be that it is
mirroring other investor features and is therefore a proxy of risk capacity. Model (1) tests
this hypothesis and Table 4 reports results showing that a relation does exist. The risk
capacity variables influencing risk attitude are age, time horizon, income, and saving:
this evidence confirms some of the literature results. Their signs are generally consistent
with what one would expect, with the exception of saving having a negative sign. Among
these variables, only age and the investment horizon account for a not-negligible share of
the risk attitude variability; however, their explanation power (measured by the R2 of the
regressions) is low: 11.5% for age and 6.8% for the investment horizon. On the whole,
the link between risk attitude and risk capacity is too weak (the regression R2 in column
(11) is 0.26) to ensure that risk attitude can be considered a reliable proxy for the risk
capacity set of variables: the correlation coefficient must be at least 0.8 to consider a test
reliable (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994).7
7We also calculate the pairwise correlations among the independent variables to exclude any collinearity effect
issues among them.
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Risk Attitude and Asset Allocation
Mean-variance analysis has long been the basic paradigm for portfolio choice. It results
in a static short-term approach, called “tactical asset allocation,” whose cornerstone is the
separation theorem, which states that risk must be adjusted by changing the percentage
invested in cash, leaving unchanged the mix of risky assets. More recently, a far-sighted
paradigm is emerging, called strategic asset allocation (Brennan, Schwartz, and Lagnado
1997). It is grounded in the evidence that if asset returns are predictable and time varying,
the optimality of tactical asset allocation is restricted to special cases, when investors
have a logarithmic utility function (Mossin 1968). Strategic asset allocation reverses the
tactical asset allocation perspective because the risk attitude should influence the risky
assets mix more than the cash percentage (Campbell and Viceira 2001). What emerges is
that conventional portfolio advice, linking the ratio of bonds and equities to risk attitude
(Canner, Mankiw, and Weil 1997), might be a rational answer to investor needs.
Table 5 reports the results of models (3), (4), and (5). The three models are run
on a subset of observations where the time horizon is clearly elicited. The risk attitude
has a weak negative influence on the cash ratio, and apart from a marginal effect of the
number of children, it exerts a strong influence on the risky asset mix. Overall the results
confirm that the recommendations are more consistent with the strategic asset allocation
approach than the tactical approach.
Risk Capacity and Asset Allocation
The strategic asset allocation perspective puts risk capacity in the spotlight. In fact, when
investors do not worry only about risks to wealth in the immediate future, they must
consider the intertemporal income flow as well as the shocks to investment opportunities.
These aspects can be understood by taking into accountmany other features of the investor
profile as well as risk attitude. A straightforward example is given by the impact of the
investment horizon on cash and bonds. Whereas for a short-term investor cash is clearly
less risky, for a long-term investor an inflation-linked bond with maturity equal to the
investment horizon turns out to be safer.
Our models include all the variables that have merited the attention of the
literature. Among the risk capacity variables, age and investment horizon are those with
the least questionable interpretation. The literature agrees on the negative role of age in
risk taking. Young investors have more human capital than older investors: because the
correlation between human capital (which is the stream of the future labor income) and
market returns is usually low, young investors can better diversify the equity market risk
(Campbell andViceira 2002; Cocco, Gomes, andMaenhout 2005). The impact of the time
horizon has long been discussed: under the classical hypotheses of serial independence
of returns and constant risk aversion (Samuelson 1994), it should not influence asset
allocation. However, strategic asset allocation challenges these hypotheses and shows the
rational foundation of takingmore short-term volatility, the so-called time diversification,
when investing in the long run (Campbell and Viceira 2001, 2002). The asset allocation
puzzle (Canner, Mankiw, and Weil 1997), an asset allocation principle well established
among practitioners, is now recognized as valid in theoretical research.
jfir_1312 jfir2011 1-13-2012 :1183
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
150 The Journal of Financial Research
TABLE 5. Investor Profile and Advisor Recommendations.
(1) (2) (3)
CASH RISKY PORTRISK
AGE 0.003∗ −0.021 −0.047
(.099) (.537) (.149)
RISKATT −0.019∗ 1.559∗∗∗ 1.516∗∗∗
(.075) (0000) (.000)
HORIZON −0.004 0.086 0.108
(.284) (.297) (.172)
D_SING −0.120∗∗∗ 1.201 1.892∗∗
(.009) (.234) (.044)
N_CHILD 0.030 −0.892∗ −1.100∗∗
(.168) (.057) (.015)
INC −0.003∗∗ 0.015 0.040
(.028) (.647) (.198)
SAV 0.011∗∗∗ −0.070 −0.153∗∗
(.004) (.385) (.048)
FIN_W 0.000 −0.002 −0.004
(.467) (.726) (.500)
D_HOME −0.043 0.614 1.140
(.288) (.490) (.173)
D_BORR 0.015 −0.034 −0.307
(.747) (.972) (.740)
Constant 0.274∗∗∗ 4.983∗∗∗ 3.706∗∗
(.001) (.004) (.025)
Observations 183 182 183
R2 0.279 0.526 0.571
Note: This table reports the results of the models 3, 4, and 5. In model 3 (column (1)), we regress CASH on
a set of risk capacity and risk attitude variables, and in models 4 (column (2)) and 5 (column (3)), we regress,
respectively, the variable RISKY and PORTRISK on the same set of risk capacity and risk attitude variables. The
cash ratio (CASH) is defined as the percentage invested in cash, considered here to be the risk-free asset, and in
the second model, we use the standard deviation of the risky portfolio (RISKY ), which excludes cash. In the third
model, we define the overall portfolio risk (PORTRISK) proxied by the standard deviation of the overall portfolio.
The risk capacity and risk attitude variables are defined as: AGE = investor’s age, measured in number of years;
HORIZON = time horizon, measured in number of years; D_SING = dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor is
in a couple, 0 otherwise; N_CHIL = number of children; SAV = saving, measured in thousands of euros; INC =
income, measured in thousands of euros; FIN_W = financial wealth, measured in thousands of euros; D_BORR =
dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor is borrowing money from a financial institution, 0 otherwise;D_HOME=
dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor is a homeowner, 0 otherwise. Robust p-values are in parentheses.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗Significant at the 10% level.
As for the variables more directly related to economic status (income, saving, and
wealth), the standard stochastic version of the permanent income hypothesis, based on
the constant relative risk aversion, predicts they should be irrelevant (Gollier 2001). This
is at odds with the empirical evidence showing that richer people hold riskier portfolios
(Carrol 2001). However a more in-depth analysis shows that controlling for other factors,
the relation tends to disappear (Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli 2001). Carrol (2000)
proposes changing the utility function to explain the rationale of rich people’s preferences.
The rich do not actually spend all their wealth because they would like to leave money
to their heirs; this bequest must be considered as a sort of luxury good. They would
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be willing to take more risks because they bet mainly on a luxury good rather than on
consumption.
Investor borrowing should influence asset allocation because it has a leverage
effect on portfolio investment, and in the same way as when a financial future is bought,
the impact of market volatility on net worth gains and losses is amplified. Therefore the
investor should adjust the risk taken according to the leverage, measured by the ratio
between assets invested and net worth; for instance, if the leverage is two, the risk taken
should be halved.
The remaining variables included in the regressions are marital status (being
single or married) and number of children. There is no scientific literature specifically
devoted to studying their relation with an optimal asset allocation, but we argue they
should play a role. The fact of having children introduces a constraint that should suggest
more prudence; a couple might better diversify everyday work and ordinary life risks,
such as illness or accidents, and therefore could take more financial risks.
The results of models (3), (4), and (5) (see Table 5) show that the cash ratio
depends mainly on certain risk capacity variables, such as age (but the significance
is very weak), marital status, income, and saving. On the contrary, only the number
of children has a weak link with the risky assets portfolio. The overall portfolio risk
is influenced only by marital status, number of children, and saving; however, their
influence comes from their effect on cash rather than from that on the risky assets
mix.
That risk capacity influences cash ratio more than risk attitude is consistent
with the theory when it predicts that cash is primarily a contingency reserve to smooth
intertemporal consumption (Campbell and Viceira 2001). The signs of the coefficients
are generally reasonable: advisors recommend a lower cash ratio to couples, young, and
high-income investors. The negative sign of saving might raise some concern. There is
anecdotal evidence that advisors state that saving is a buffer against real and financial
risks that hedges the effects of losses. On this reasoning, the advisor should recommend
a high saver to hold less cash; that is, the sign should be positive. We think the negative
sign can be explained by assuming that saving is driven mainly by the investors’ goals
and constraints that are described in detail in the information given to the advisors: the
investors want to buy a house within the space of a few years, to invest more money in
their professional activity, to help their children, and so on. The more the investors’ goals
are financially demanding, the more they are urged to save to achieve them. Because we
could not use such goals and constraints in the econometric analysis, we see only their
indirect effects on saving. Overall, the results on the cash ratio and the risky portfolio
support this hypothesis: saving is positively related to the cash ratio, but there is no
link with the risk of risky portfolios. There is a negative impact on the overall risk, but
it is due to the liquidity constraints imposed on the investment policy rather than to a
deliberate decision to pick safer asset classes. This explanation is consistent with the
results on income, which is negatively linked to the cash ratio: all else equal, suggesting
to investors with higher salaries that they should hold less liquidity is straightforward. At
the same time, one should agree that saving is more important than income in deciding the
cash ratio, and in fact we found a weaker effect of income, which does not significantly
influence the risk of the overall portfolio.
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Wewould have expected a clearer influence of some risk capacity variables on the
risky portfolio. As we have seen, there is a rationale for neglecting wealth (either financial
wealth or real estate wealth), even if the conventional wisdom and recent theories (Carrol
2000) attribute to wealthy investors a more than proportional capacity for taking risks. It
is more difficult to justify the lack of significance of age and of the investment horizon,
which should play an important role in strategic asset allocation. However, with regard
to the investment horizon, the results show it conveys some relevant information. The
figures reported in Table 5 are from regressions run on observations whose investment
horizon is clearly elicited by the investor, because in the sample where the investment
horizon is missing, the F-test of the model rejects the fixed effect hypothesis. This means
that knowledge of the investment horizon leads to a more complete specification of the
investor profile, thus leading the advisor to a more systematic and clearer heterogeneity.
We argue that if the advisor does not have a precise measure of the time horizon, he or
she will probably use the other information given by the investor (e.g., his or her targets)
to make assumptions we cannot control for, thereby creating noise in the unobserved
component and jeopardizing the model.
Finally, the neglect of investors borrowing merits criticism. Advisors deal with
the assets side of investors’ balance sheets (the wealth to be invested) and neglect the
liability side (the financial borrowing). The presence of debt has a leverage effect on
portfolio investment and, in the same way as when a financial future is bought, the impact
of market volatility on gains and losses is amplified. Most investors are probably not
aware of this, but their advisors should be, and as a consequence they should suggest
more caution in taking risks.
The Relevance of Advisory
Advisory may benefit investors because they often incur in two types of systematic errors
in the asset allocation process: choosing portfolios below the efficient frontier or picking
the wrong point along the efficient frontier. The welfare loss of the first error is in most
circumstances small, even when the differences between actual and optimal weights are
large (Brennan and Torous 1999).
We address the second point, which is only partially covered by the studies
matching the recommendations with investor prototypes (Canner, Mankiw, and Weil
1997), because a key element of the service in this case would be customization, accord-
ing to which the advice must be suited to the real investor rather than to a prototype.
Customization depends on two dimensions: how many investor features influence the
asset allocation and what their quantitative impact is. The two previous sections show
that the relatively small number of risk capacity variables influencing the asset allocation
limits the scope of customization. Here we want to analyze their impact because if it
is small, we should conclude that advisory is poorly customized and therefore of little
importance for investors.
We measure the economic impact of variables as the product of their estimated
coefficients and their sample standard deviations. Variability plays an important role in
customization because a variable with low variability cannot account for large differences
in the recommendations issued for different investors.
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TABLE 6. Economic Impact of the Significant Variables on the Cash Ratio (CASH) and the Overall Risk
(PORTRISK).
The Estimated Mean Level of CASH The Estimated Mean Level of PORTRISK
(ECASH) 19.29% (EPORTRISK) 8.88%
Economic Impact of Each Significant Variable
Risk attitude (RISKATT) −2.74% Risk attitude (RISKATT) 2.18%
Investor age (AGE) 3.21%
Family composition (D_SING) −12.00% Family composition (D_SING) 1.89%
Investor saving (SAV ) 11.64% Investor saving (SAV ) −1.63%
Investor income (INC) −10.38% Investor number of children (N_CHILD) −1.01%
Note: This table shows the impact on asset allocation, measured by CASH and PORTRISK, of changes () in the
investor profile variables, according to the results of model (3) and (5) reported in Table 5. CASH is the percentage
invested in cash, and the investor profile variables affecting it according to model (1) are: investor risk attitude
(RISKATT) assuming values from 1 (low-risk attitude) to 5 (high-risk attitude); investor age (AGE), measured in
number of years; D_SING, dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor is in a couple, 0 otherwise; investor saving
(SAV ) and income (INC), measured in thousand euros. PORTRISK is the standard deviation of the overall portfolio,
and the investor profile variables affecting it according to model (3) are: investor risk attitude (RISKATT);D_SING,
dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor is in a couple, 0 otherwise; investor saving (SAV ) and investor number of
children (N_CHIL). The estimated mean levels of variables CASH (ECASH) and PORTRISK (EPORTRISK) are
calculated as the product of the coefficients of the significant variables in models (3) and (5) and the sample mean
values (X¯ ) of the same variables, reported in Table 2, so that:
ECASH = αˆ + βˆ1 X¯RISKATT + βˆ2 X¯AGE + βˆ3 X¯ DSING + βˆ4 X¯ SAV + βˆ5 X¯ INC
EPORTRISK = ˆˆα + ˆˆβ1 X¯RISKATT + ˆˆβ2 X¯ D SING + ˆˆβ3 X¯ SAV + ˆˆβ4 X¯ N CHIL
The mean value of risk attitude (3.37) and number of sons (0.77) are rounded up to the next integer. The economic
impact is calculated as the product of the coefficients of the significant variables in models (1) and (3) and the
sample standard deviation (S) of the same variables, reported in Table 2 (Panel B). For example, the economic
impact of RISKATT on CASH is calculated as the product of –1.516 from model (1) in Table 5 and its standard
deviation, equal to 1.44. For the dummy D_SING, the impact is calculated setting the variable equal to 1 (couple).
We focus on two dimensions of asset allocation: cash ratio and overall risk. As
Table 6 shows, annual income and saving have greater customization power on the cash
ratio, with a relative economic impact of 60%: the relative economic impact is simply the
ratio between the economic impact and the estimated mean level of the cash ratio (e.g.,
11.64%/19.29%). Starting from an estimated mean level of about 19%, the cash ratio can
easily go to 30% or to 8% depending on the levels of these variables. The joint effect
of being a family rather than a single person could result in a cash ratio very close to
zero. The economic impact of age and risk attitude is instead much smaller. This analysis
confirms that cash is considered as a contingency reserve influenced by future income
and spending flows.
Whereas the relative economic impact of risk attitude on the cash ratio is about
14% (e.g., 2.74%/19.29%), its impact on the overall risk is the largest, at 24.5% (e.g.,
2.18%/8.88%). The risk attitude can change the risk taken from an estimated mean level
of 8.88% upward to 11.06% or downward to 6.7%. However, the economic impact of
the demographic variables is only slightly smaller, for example, saving at 18.4% (e.g.,
1.63%/8.88%). It may therefore happen that risk attitude and risk capacity offset each
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other: whereas the risk attitude has the clearer impact on risk, it does not overwhelm the
risk capacity. This confirms advisors are able to balance the two main dimensions of the
investor profile, even though a small number of significant risk capacity variables affect
the customization of their recommendations.
Diversification Behavior
Inadequate diversification may cause large welfare losses for investors: in such cases,
investors could be both far from the efficient frontier and at the wrong point along it.
Our asset allocation recommendations, which mostly consist of mutual fund shares, offer
an empirical example of “style investing” by advisors. Style investing is defined as an
investment process whereby investors allocate money among styles, or asset classes,
rather than among individual securities. It is widely recognized that style investing is
influenced by the historical performance of asset classes, with funds flowing from the
worst performing classes to the better classes (Barberis and Shleifer 2003).
This kind of diversification cannot be directly compared with that at the level of
individual securities. Although an investor holding one security is not diversifying, an
investor with a single fund may be more diversified than one holding two funds. However,
in both cases it is important to understand whether the advisors’ diversification behavior
is driven by the actual correlations.
This is an interesting point because both experimental and empirical studies find
that individuals overlook correlations (Kroll and Levy 1992; Dorn and Huberman 2007)
or apply the naı¨ve diversification heuristic, which give rise to weights 1/n for n-choices
of investment alternatives (Benartzi and Thaler 2001). Although these studies concern
the behavior of private investors, there is evidence that professionals may overlook cor-
relations as well: Siebenmorgen and Weber (2003) run an experiment showing that the
well-educated employees of a German bank set all correlations to one when making their
recommendations.
Our analysis examines the behavior of professionals from an empirical perspec-
tive and uses a richer andmore representative sample than the 23 subjects of Siebenmorgen
and Weber’s study. Table 7 reports the results on the drivers of diversification behavior.
Column (2) shows that DIVERBEN is high, on average (the constant term in
the regression is 0.497) and always closely and negatively linked only with risk attitude,
whereas the other variables are far from being significant.8 By contrast, column (1) shows
that the link with the Herfindhal index is weaker and limited to the negative impact of
financial wealth. This means that advisors diversify by taking account of risk attitude and
the actual correlations among asset classes, and that less wealthy investors receive more
concentrated proposals. If the portfolio were directly invested in securities, the negative
impact of financial wealth on theHerfindhal indexwould be rationally grounded. Because
the transaction costs of mutual funds and the minimum investment are lower than in
the case of securities, they make it possible to relax the constraint of financial wealth on
the number of funds underwritten. Therefore, in our sample, advisors fail to exploit one
of the most interesting features of mutual funds.
8The effect of risk attitude is robust also after dropping all insignificant variables.
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TABLE 7. Investor Profile and Advisor Diversification Behavior.
(1) (2)
HERFINDHAL DIVERBEN
AGE −0.001 0.002
(.642) (.248)
RISKATT −0.013 −0.030∗∗∗
(.259) (.004)
HORIZON −0.006 0.002
(.123) (.477)
D_SING −0.066 0.029
(.162) (.482)
N_CHILD 0.009 0.005
(.678) (.787)
INC 0.000 0.000
(.951) (.823)
SAV 0.002 0.000
(.696) (.978)
FIN_W −0.001∗∗ 0.000
(.013) (.499)
D_HOME 0.031 −0.077∗∗
(.457) (.042)
D_BORR −0.054 −0.028
(.254) (.497)
Constant 0.488∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗
(.000) (.000)
Observations 183 183
R2 0.202 0.247
Note: This table reports the results of the models (6) and (7). In model (6) (column (1)), we regress the Herfindhal
index (HERFINDHAL) on a set of risk capacity and risk attitude variables, and in model 4 (column (2)) we regress
the variable (DIVERBEN) on the same set of risk capacity and risk attitude variables. HERFINDHAL captures the
diversification behavior without taking the correlations into account. It is defined as:
HERFINDHAL =
N∑
i=1
w2i ,
where wi is the percentage invested in asset class i. The index takes value 1 when the portfolio is in-
vested only in one asset class, and value 1/N when the funds are split equally among the suggested asset classes.
DIVERBEN captures the extent to which the imperfect correlation among asset classes reduces portfolio risk,
given the weights structure of the suggested asset classes and it is defined as:
DIVERBEN = σ
2
p|ρ=1 − σ 2p
σ 2p|ρ=1
=
∑
i = j
∑
j
wiw j (1 − ρi, j )σiσ j
σ 2p|ρ=1
,
where σ 2p is the variance of portfolio returns calculated using actual correlations, and σ
2
p|ρ=1 is the variance of
portfolio returns when all correlations are set to 1. In our asset-allocation recommendations, whose asset weights
were always positive, the index took values close to 0 when the correlations among asset classes were close
to 1 and/or when the asset weights were heavily concentrated. The risk capacity and risk attitude variables are
defined as: AGE = investor’s age, measured in number of years; HORIZON = time horizon, measured in number
of years; D_SING = dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor is in a couple, 0 otherwise; N_CHIL = number
of children; SAV = saving, measured in thousands of euros; INC = income, measured in thousands of euros;
FIN_W = financial wealth, measured in thousands of euros; D_BORR = dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor
is borrowing money from a financial institution, 0 otherwise; D_HOME = dummy variable equal to 1 if the
investor is a homeowner, 0 otherwise. Robust p-values are in parentheses.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
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Advisors pursuing a rational diversification strategy instead of a naı¨ve strategy are
good news for investors, even if one must consider that a naı¨ve strategy with a sufficient
number of securities (preferably at least 20; Brennan and Torous 1999) may result in a
portfolio with a good risk and return trade-off. The rationale under the effectiveness of
a random naı¨ve diversification strategy can be understood by analyzing the determinants
of the DIVERBEN , as defined in Section III: concentration, correlations, and variances.
If the number of securities is not too small, the strategy works well with respect
to all the determinants because by definition it avoids concentration, and the average
correlations and variances converge to the market. We imagine an investor may take an
unintended risk if he or she moves from a random strategy, where he or she does not
pay attention to the selection of securities, to a deliberate strategy, because there are
behavioral biases, such as familiarity (Huberman 2001), that may worsen the results of
the strategy.
With these premises one may claim the improvement in the risk and return
trade-off resulting from a rational diversification strategy may be offset by the cost of
advisory. Nevertheless, we believe that indirect investment in mutual funds and similar
instruments, despite guaranteeing by definition a minimum diversification level, may be
more complex and tricky from the perspective of an ordinary investor exploiting a naı¨ve
strategy.
First of all, the investor is exposed to a supply bias. Investors usually build their
portfolios by selecting funds from a set proposed by a broker: if the set has, say, two stock
funds and four bond funds, it will result in a very different portfolio from one derived
from a set with four stock and two bond funds (Benartzi and Thaler 2001).
Second, there are many funds with similar fundamentals despite having different
names, and investor choices are driven more by formal features than by fundamentals
(Cooper, Gulen, and Rau 2005). It may therefore happen that investors believe they are
diversifying, though what they are essentially doing is underwriting funds with different
names.
Finally, in our data set the recommendations consist in a relatively small number
of funds (on average 5.6), and therefore a naı¨ve strategy may be less effective and the
negative impact of behavioral biases in fund selection stronger.
The Supply Side at a Glance
Our data on advisors are less in depth than our data on investors: we know only their
names and nationality, the assets under management of their company, and whether they
recommended funds managed by their company. Even if these data cannot give a satisfac-
tory representation of advisor characteristics, they can be used to test the principal–agent
conflicts that could undermine the recommendations. Advisors who suggest the funds
managed by their company, instead of simply giving the asset classes of the funds, may
be considered as more exposed to a conflict of interest. Moreover, one may argue that the
size of assets under management matters because small companies usually manage fewer
funds, and at least when the advisor suggests mainly his or her own company funds, this
could limit the range of choices. On the other hand, one could also argue that small man-
agers are less prone to this bias simply because they cannot resort too much to their own
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products. Of course, this argument holds only if it emerges that small managers actually
do not give a privileged position to their company’s funds. The advisor’s nationality may
be important, not so much because we think that Italians are better or worse, but because
sharing a nationality with clients could induce an overweighting of Italian markets. We
find that a minority (37%) of Italians exhibits the home bias.
The advisor characteristics do not explain the unexplained variability of recom-
mendations in the investor profile. We do not report the results of the regressions run
according to the model of equation (8) because the F-test never supports the fixed effect
hypothesis.
V. Conclusion
We study how advisors perform the task of providing investors with tailor-made strategic
asset allocation recommendations. Given the difficulty of beating the market, advisors
may find that they can add value for their clients by issuing customized recommendations.
In fact, there is evidence the most common and damaging error made by investors is to
pick the wrong point along the efficient frontier.
In short, we show that risk attitude has more influence on the risky asset mix,
whereas the social and demographic variables have more influence on the percentage
invested in cash. On the whole, advisors issue recommendations that may be consistent
with a strategic approach to asset allocation, but the small number of investor charac-
teristics influencing asset allocation limits the extent of their customization. Another
remarkable result is that advisors split funds among asset classes by looking at the ac-
tual correlations and that they do so by consistently taking account of the risk attitude.
Ordinary investors usually resort to simple heuristics to pursue diversification, such as
the naı¨ve diversification where funds are evenly split among securities. We claim these
heuristics may perform well when investors directly buy securities. When, as in our case,
they consider indirect investment through mutual funds, these heuristics may lead to less
sensible outcomes without improving the diversification already given by a single fund.
For instance, one reason is that investors look more at the formal features of the funds, es-
pecially the names, instead of at the fundamentals. It may therefore happen that investors
believe they are diversifying, while what they are doing is essentially underwriting funds
with different names.
The literature on finance, after having paid much attention over the years to
efficiency issues, has more recently covered many specific behavioral issues. Overall,
these studies show that financial intermediaries in household finance can fill the gap
between the normative view (what people should do) and the positive view (what people
actually do). We therefore contribute to an area that is relatively unexplored in the finance
literature.
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